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Evolution, knowledge and Christian faith: Gerd Theissen and the cred­
ibility of theology
In this article the way in which Theissen uses the evolutionary paradigm  
as a comprehensive framework for interpreting not only central themes in 
theology but also the credibility of theology as such, is analysed from an 
epistemological point of view. Theissen's overall choice for critical ration­
alism is critized as an epistemological blurring of paradigms, and thus of 
models of rationality, and typified as a quest for realism and explanatory 
progress in theology instead. In interpreting the evolutionary paradigm  
for theology, Theissen does, however, open up exciting possibilities for 
retaining the scientific and cognitive status of theological statements.
1. AN EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN  
FAITH
Gerd Theissen's recent Biblical faith : An evolutionary approach  (1984) is 
an excellent example of the fact that the credibility of theology is 
invariably linked to the problem of the credibility of Christian faith as 
such. To be able to fully appreciate his important perspective on this 
problem, I think this book should be read against the background of his 
former On having a critical faith  (1979). From both these books emerge 
what can surely be seen as the most basic problems for any critical 
contemporary theologian:
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• why he/she continues to identify consciously and openly with the 
Christian tradition;
• the problem of truth in theology, which as such poses the unavoid­
able epistemological quest for rationality in theological thought.
The basic theses of both Theissen's books can be summed up as 
follows;
• There are good reasons for being a Christian and for constructing 
Christian theology in a scientifically credible way.
• This does not, however, mean that Christianity can be defended in 
its traditional form.
• If good theology, and therefore what 1 would prefer to call the quest 
for epistemological credibility has to be retained, Christian faith will 
have and should be able to change.
Theissen (1979) explicitly wants to point out that Christian faith can 
stand up to relativist, empiricist and ideological critique, and what is 
even more important: the Christian theologian can offer unconditional 
personal commitment and renounce any absolutist claims for theolog­
ical statements at the same time. This intention of his will have 
far-reaching consequences when in Biblical fa ith : An evolutionary ap ­
proach  he specifically follows Karl Popper and epistemologically opts 
for a critical rationalist paradigm of thought. Already in the first of the 
two books (1979; 2ff) Theissen -  to my mind correctly -  states that 'truth' 
in theology could never be a limited number of established proposi­
tions but instead functions as a normative idea that constantly puts all 
our theological statements to the test. What Theissen really means by 
this, will of course have to be assessed very carefully.
Theissen rightly warns that theologians should avoid the intellectual 
coma (1979; 6) of positivism in theology (cf Van Huyssteen 1986; 23ff) at 
all cost. This means that traditional Christian religious statements 
should be reformulated in such a way that they could be shown to be 
expressions of possible religious experience. Here Theissen is very 
much to the point; relating theological statements, as the intellectual 
reflection on religious statements, to religious experience as such, could 
be the only way of countering the suspicion that religious statements 
may be projective, illusionary and thus anti-realistic by nature (cf Van 
Huyssteen 1986; 169ff). This is probably the most important reason why 
I would typify Theissen's work as a quest for realism in theology, 
although he, unfortunately, never identifies this all-important problem
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from a contemporary philosophy of science point of view. My main 
objections to the way in which he eventually opts for the evolutionary 
paradigm will be directly related to what I would prefer to call an 
epistem ological blurring of paradigms, and thus of models of rational­
ity, in Theissen's otherwise excellent work.
I would therefore like to show that it is not so much Theissen's 
underlying realist position that 1 personally find problematical, but 
much rather the epistemological model of thought and the type of 
assumptions he works from to arrive at this position.
A central theme of both books is therefore to be found in the 
profound statement that an ontological gulf (1979; 12) permeates 
reality. For Gerd Theissen this is the basic (epistemological) reason why 
the objects of religious experience transcend the ordinary everyday 
world. He consequently speaks of a 'more than life', a 'search for a 
reality which has yet to be disclosed' (1979: 13), and an 'adaptation to a 
reality which extends beyond humanity' (1984: 15). From a philosophy 
of science point of view this obviously reveals a theoretical commitment 
to some form of realism in theology. But in neither of the two books this 
basic assumption is ever put to discussion. What could have become 
the most exciting and creative basis of Theissen's argument, for this 
very reason unfortunately becomes the most problematical.
1 can otherwise fully identify with Theissen's basic and central 
question: Will religion eventually and irreversably be dissolved in the 
process of secularization, or does it in fact preserve an attitude to reality 
which will never be out of date (1979: 20)? Obviously religion is tied up 
with the quest for meaning in human life, but the central question 
remains: Do religious experiences indeed have a real content (1979: 26), 
or as I would prefer to phrase it, do religious experiences and our 
theological statements about these experiences really refer?
Theissen in fact specifically raises this question (although to my mind 
he never answers it in a satisfactory way): Are there any reasons why 
religious conceptions should be grounded in an objective reality or are 
they all based on dogmatic confessions of faith (1979: 28f)? To this 
question he provides a very ambiguous answer, which I think is 
directly related to a very problematical reception of the Popperian 
model of thought, or what 1 earlier called a 'blurring' of paradigms, in 
his own theorizing:
• On the one hand Theissen (1979: 23) clearly states that it is as
im possible to show some of our contemporaries that religion in ­
8  HTS 44/1 (1988)
volves a fundamental relationship to reality (and is not just a reaction 
to frustration or an unconscious piece of self-realization) as it is to 
show colours to a blind man.
• On the other hand Theissen (1979: 29) claims that we must look for an 
'em pirical' basis for religious statements, and then on the basis of the 
fact that statements can only be tested if the reality to which they 
relate can be compared with the reality that we experience.
I fully sympathise with the fact that in the long run religious experi­
ences should be seen as the only real origin of statements of faith and 
thus also of theological statements. But if this empirical basis should 
imply a correspondence theory of truth where the reality of religious 
experiences should be 'tested' against the reality to which these 
experiences relate, this of course becomes highly problematical. Theis­
sen (1979: 32) explicitly states:
The anthropomorphic reality which religious statements seek to 
express must be compared with the reality which we experience; 
this is the only way of testing its truth-content.
This not only implies an epistemological retreat to a positivist paradigm 
as far as a model of rationality for theology goes, but also goes directly 
against Theissen's own Popperian or critical rationalist idea of a 
normative truth.
In theology any access to the reality to which believers relate in terms 
of a corresponding theory of truth is obviously impossible. But quite 
apart from the problems positivism has created and still creates for 
theology, access to the reality to which believers relate, is possible only 
through the metaphorical concepts of the Christian faith. And this 
becomes epistemologically credible only within a critical realist model 
of rationality. As I have tried to point out earlier, it is only within this 
type of rationality model that the Christian theologian can offer 
unconditional personal commitment and at the same time critically 
renounce all absolutist claims for theological knowledge. And this, I 
think, is precisely what Theissen wants to achieve.
Against this background I find it tremendously important that 
Theissen can explicitly state that religious conceptions have a sym bolic 
character (1979: 30), and that in these conceptions 'the familiar is 
projected on to the unfamiliar, and earthly images serve as metaphors 
for "divine m ysteries'". My critical question here would be -  especially 
when he eventually uses metaphors from the theory of evolution -
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whether Theissen really follows through the creative possibilities of 
this line of though and whether he indeed grasps the full epistemolo- 
gical and methodological implications of this implied theological real­
ism for the scientific credibility of theology?
The constructive choice in Theissen's thought for a form of realism in 
theology seems very obvious when he asks: 'Are there structural 
affinities between non-human and human reality? Only if this is so, can 
there be a justifiable foundation for the anthropomorphism of religious 
imagery' (1979: 32). What really is meant by 'structural affinity' will 
eventually be all-important for an evaluation of Theissen's choice for an 
evolutionary explanation of the Christian faith. It will obviously also be 
basic to any credible form of realism in theology, and will therefore 
have to be defined carefully.
Furthermore, what is very important for understanding Theissen's 
version of realism in theology, is that he can -  and correctly so -  state: 
'W hatever we may understand by "G od", he cannot be conceived of 
without his being related to the whole universe, the most distant 
galaxies and the tiniest atomic elements' (1979: 33). And to this he adds 
the profound statement: 'Religion seeks to relate man to the whole of 
reality, not only to our fellowman, even if our neighbour may concern 
us more than anyone else.'
Theissen eventually chooses a comprehensive concept which covers 
both relationships between human beings and experiences of the holy 
other than in human relationships, and this he calls the experience of 
resonance (1979: 33; 1984: 19f). This concept implies not only structural 
affinities which are objectively present, but also their subjective effects: 
on the one hand, man shows his longing for resonance in reality. On the 
other, he is powerfully affected by the structures in reality which are 
capable of resonance and adopts a responsive attitude towards them 
(1979: 33).
Furthermore, since religious experiences are concerned with mean­
ing, every experience of resonance stands out from the background of 
possible absurdity. For Theissen (1979 : 34) religion therefore is the 
sensitivity towards the resonance and absurdity of reality. And the 
credibility of religion would therefore depend on whether there is an 
experience of the holy which is capable of moving life to the very 
depths and which at the same time can withstand critical examination.
After having discussed the amazing structural affinity between the 
constructs of science and what he calls 'objective reality' (1979: 35f), 
Theissen proceeds and develops his argument for what would eventu­
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ally become (1984) an evolutionary interpretation of the essentials of the 
Christian faith, by specifically stating;
It could well be that the similarity between nature and the 
structures created by our understanding requires the hypothesis 
of an objective spirit, a creative understanding or an intrinsic 
purpose within the universe (1979: 35).
Why Theissen specifically chooses the theory of evolution to try to deal 
with the credibility of Christian belief from the perspective of scientific 
thought, is never really made quite clear -  except for the fact that the 
evolutionary paradigm is regarded as the most comprehensive scien­
tific framework that we can use in our time (Theissen 1984: xi). His 
choice for the theory of evolution might perhaps best be explained by 
the following statement:
It is possible to interpret the whole of evolution from aqueous 
matter to the most complicated organisms as a heightening of life. 
In that case, man's own life appears as the echo of an all embracing 
tendency of life towards something more than life (Theissen 1979: 
48).
This quotation highlights the -  to my mind -  two most important 
factors in Theissen's theological model, and also the basic reasons for 
his choice for the paradigm of evolution as an explanatory model for 
Christian faith:
• his decision for a very definite form of realism in theology;
• his basic and ultimate decision for Christianity.
An evaluation of Theissen's exciting thought will therefore not only 
have to deal with his interpretative adaptation of evolutionary catego­
ries for theological thought, but also very specifically with the realist 
implications of his basic argument and with the difficult question as to 
whether his ultimate commitment to the Christian faith is indeed 
compatable with his apparent choice for what he calls the 'evolutionary 
epistemology' of Karl Popper's critical rationalism (Theissen 1984: xii).
2. THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION, FAITH AND KNOW LEDGE
In his recent book Theissen (1984) very clearly outlines his objectives: 
he wants to analyse and interpret Biblical faith with the help of
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evolutionary categories, seeing the theory of evolution as one of the 
most fascinating constructions of human reason which as such can 
generate an explanation of the framework which determines our life 
(1984: xi).
Theissen therefore clearly handles the theory of evolution as an 
explanatory structure by which our knowledge can -  as he specifically 
states (1984: xi) -  adapt to reality. Obviously the theory of evolution 
itself has undergone evolution, can never be absolutised and as such 
has limited validity. But what is even more important is that Theissen 
(1984: xii) also explicitly rejects any form of biologism , i e, a naive 
transference of biology to human culture. In fact he interprets human 
history (including the history of Biblical faith) by means of a theory 
which analogously derives from biology and therefore does not claim 
an unbroken continuity between biological evolution and human 
history.
W hen Theissen eventually analyses and interprets Biblical history, he 
therefore never in a naively optimistic way sees straight lines of 
development from the beginnings of Israel to primitive Christianity. 
On the contrary, he consistently stresses discontinuity, the break in 
history, the new beginning: thus monotheism in Israel (1984: 43ff) and 
Jesus of Nazareth, his proclamation and ministry, are not interpreted as 
the result of an 'evolution', understood as continuous development 
(1984: 8 3 -128). Both of these are instead to be viewed as revolutions in 
the history of religion.
In outlining the analogies between biological and cultural evolution, 
Theissen uses the theory of evolution as an explanatory model for 
dealing with the complex and problematical relationship between faith 
and knowledge. Eventually he tries to demonstrate that with the aid of 
evolutionary categories like adaptation, selection and mutation, faith 
and knowledge can be shown to have much more in common than the 
so-called 'contradictions' (1984: 3 - 8 )  between scientific thought and 
religious faith would seem to suggest.
The fact that Theissen contrasts scientific thought and faith in the 
first chapter of his book, seems to be rather obvious and unproblemati- 
cal. That he does, however, try to pinpoint the knowledge-faith prob­
lem by identifying three contradictions between scientific thought and 
faith I find highly problematical. I think that not so much the so-called 
contradictions between scientific thought and faith should be dis­
cussed, but much rather -  and much more appropriate -  the problem­
atical relationship between scientific thought, on the one hand, and 
theological reflection on faith, on the other.
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Later in this book (1984: 37) -  unfortunately after having discussed 
the three contradictions between scientific thought and faith -  Theissen 
does in fact refine this problem in a way and suggests a parallel 
development or co-evolution of knowledge and faith, or science and 
theology. He in fact typifies science and theology both as thought- 
through and therefore systematized forms of belief. It is indeed not so 
much the relationship between science and faith, but instead the 
relationship between science and theology -  as critical reflection on 
faith -  which is the real problem here.
I also think that this refined and more accurate distinction would 
have rather profoundly influenced the way Theissen identifies 'contra­
dictions' between science and faith. Religious faith would only be in 
opposition to science within a positivist paradigm, and of course also in 
a critical rationalist one. W ithin a critical rationalist model of rational­
ity, faith could of course be meaningful and even true (cf Van Huys- 
steen 1986: 44). Faith, and statements about faith could, however, never 
form part of the so-called scientific context of justification and therefore 
of the scienfitic process itself. The fact that Theissen consciously 
chooses for a Popperian and thus critical rationalist epistemology will 
obviously be of direct relevance for the way in which he deals with the 
relationship between religious faith and knowledge. W hether Theissen 
in fact remains true to the Popperian line of thought, remains to be 
seen.
I am convinced that in the end Theissen's choice for the theory of 
evolution as an attempt to integrate human knowledge, is not so much 
motivated by the critical rationalist ideas of verisim ilitude, corrobora­
tion and falsification, but by the realist assumptions and eventual 
exciting realist im plications of this model for theology. From a philos­
ophy of science point of view it would therefore have been more 
consistent as well as more fruitful to opt for a realist position in 
scientific as well as theological thought. This would have enabled him 
to retain his arguments for the credibility of theological thought, but 
then with a much more convincing and stronger epistemological basis.
3. THE THREE CON TRAD ICTION S BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC 
TH OUGH T AND FAITH
Eventually Theissen (1984: 18ff) correctly sees knowledge and faith as 
complementary expressions of life. His attempt to integrate faith and
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knowledge now makes it necessary to take a closer look at the way he 
not only identifies three contradictions between scientific thought and 
faith, but also at the way each of these contradictions are in the end 
'revitalized' by Theissen. The three contradictions and Theissen's 
revised and improved interpretations of these 'standard problems' are:
3.1 Scientific statements are hypothetical while statements of faith 
are apodeictic (1984: 4)
-  over against this Theissen (1984: 18) states:
Hypothetical scientific thought and apodeictic faith are different 
forms of adapting to an unknown reality
The way in which Theissen's choice for a critical rationalist model of 
rationality determines both these formulations, have already been 
briefly pointed out. From a realist position, where the real problem has 
been identified as the problematical relationship between scientific 
thought and theological thought, it would suffice to say: Both scientific 
and theological thought are provisional and therefore each in its own 
way hypothetical and as such forms of 'adapting' to different dim en­
sions of an unknown reality. Furthermore, this does not in any way 
contradict the 'apodeictic' character of living faith and the ultimate 
religious commitment that grounds this faith. 1 am therefore convinced 
that the character of the act of faith and the ultimate religious com m it­
ment that always precedes it, should in no way be confused with the 
nature of statements about faith, which in their own way are as 
hypothetical as any other scientific statements.
What 1 therefore find lacking in Theissen's otherwise excellent work, 
is a clear distinction between the role and functions of an ultimate 
religious commitment and that of a theoretical commitment to a specific 
paradigm of thought. This distinction is necessary if he -  with good 
reasons -  still prefers to opt for the explanatory possibilities of the 
evolutionary model so that he can move away from the often tacit 
limitations of positivism which still haunt the rationality model of 
critical rationalism, to the much more creative epistemological possi­
bilities of current scientific realism.
What makes this so important is that Theissen, although apparently 
following Popper in his choice for an evolutionary epistemology, does 
not seem to realize the implications of this choice for the credibility of 
theological thought: From a critical rationalist viewpoint not only faith
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and an ultimate religious commitment are bracketed out of the scientific 
'level' of the so-called context of justification, but also the analogous 
interpretation of cultural evolution as a higher form of biological 
evolution are -  vk̂ hen it comes to the history of Christian faith -  in no 
way open to falsification in the true sense of the word. The acceptance 
of an evolutionary epistemology and certain basic concepts from critical 
rationalism in this way therefore leads to the 'blurring' of paradigms of 
which I spoke earlier. The answer to this problem is, I think, to be found 
in the transcending of this thought model and in an exploration of the 
very obvious quest for realism which so clearly typifies Theissen's 
work.
3.2 Scientific thought is subject to falsification; faith goes against 
the facts (Theissen 1984: 4)
-  in contrast to this Theissen (1984: 18) claims;
Science controlled by falsification and faith which goes against 
the facts are different forms of coping with the pressure of 
selection exercised by reality
I think this statement of Theissen's can only be apphed to religious faith 
as a lived deed (fides qua), but never to theological reflection and 
therefore to theological statements about faith as such. Of course, in 
most of the (natural) sciences progress is monitored in terms of success 
and therefore in terms of the elimination of errors. In theology this 
process of justifiability by experimental or empirical falsification is 
obviously not possible. I am, however, convinced that w ithin a critical 
realist paradigm, theological theories can be shown to be problem ­
solving and progressive, but then in terms of hermeneutical, philoso­
phy of science, historical, literary and linguistic criteria.
In this case both the constructs of science and theology give us our 
only access to the different domains of reality we are groping for and as 
such are always provisional and hypothetical. The real problem there­
fore is not so much falsification by facts or going against facts, but:
• the fact that scientific and theological thought can both only function 
w ithin the framework of a very definite theoretical commitment to 
specific models of rationality, and
• that theological thought is apparently always preceded by a very 
definite ultimate (religious) commitment.
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3.3 Scientific thought delights in dissension; faith is based on 
consensus (Theissen 1984: 4—8)
-  this 'contradiction' is now rephrased by Theissen (1984: 30ff) to 
read:
Science which delights in dissent and faith which depends on 
consensus are different forms of the openness of our spiritual 
life to mutations
Again, this might be true, but the problem surrounding the credibility 
of theological thought from a philosophy of science point of view, has 
still not been addressed at all.
Indeed faith as such, as lived by believers in the church, tends 
towards consensus. Theissen is also correct in pointing out that the 
early church developed three social controls to protect this consensus: 
the canon, the regula fidei as a confession to what was seen as the 
essence of Christian faith, and the episcopacy. This indeed in a sense 
obligates the church and its believers to tradition (Theissen 1984: 33), to 
consensus (1984: 34) and to authority (1984: 45).
None of these, however, can be said to be true of an epistemologically 
(and thus scientifically) credible, constructive theology where the 
weight of rational argument is as important as in any scientific process 
of theorizing. Furthermore, the classical text of the Christian tradition 
not so much controls consensus in an authoritarian way but should 
hermeneutically function within a critical realist problem-solving 
model where text and tradition are to be constantly reinterpreted (cf 
Van Huyssteen 1987). As far as church office and the authority that goes 
with it are concerned: This to my mind may function in a meaningful 
way in the church itself, but is as such totally irrelevant for a construc­
tive theology.
1 therefore think that Theissen not only obscures the very valid 
distinction between faith and statements about faith, but also that 
between community faith (1984: 4) and theology as such. This obvi­
ously can leave no room for a trans-confessional, much broader con­
ceptualized constructive theology but can only lead to a very restricted 
form of 'church' or 'confessional theology'.
To therefore contrast the originality of science with community 
faith's fidelity to tradition, can within this context never be accepted. In 
theological thought it can be its originality and creative construction 
(within a valid and thought-through realist paradigm), that forms the 
essence of theological theorizing (Van Huyssteen 1986: 206ff). What is
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more, Thomas S Kuhn (1970a: 180f; 1970b: 253) convincingly showed 
that also scientific communities -  in periods of 'normal science' -  
display an enormous fidelity to tradition.
Theissen's argument can now be summed up as follows:
• Just as in biological evolution life has developed through mutation 
and selection towards constantly new forms of adaptation to reality, 
so too culture has developed different forms of adapting to the basic 
conditions of reality: and of these science, art and religion are the 
most important. And only when these complement one another do 
they do justice to the richness of reality. Each of these should in fact 
be seen as an independent way of coming to grips with reality.
• In this process of coming to grips with reality, forms can be 
established which are analogous to those in the processes of muta­
tion and selection. In this sense features common to knowledge and 
faith can be established in the light of the basic categories of the 
theory of evolution, namely adaptation, selection and mutation 
(1984: 8f).
• Theissen therefore assumes a continuity between biological and 
cultural evolution (which leads to the analogies between them) but 
states: cultural evolution is not simply the continuation of biological 
evolution but a higher form of it. In both areas development 
presupposes (i) the appearance of variation; (ii) a selection from the 
variants; and (iii) their preservation. The paradigm of evolution 
therefore reveals two phases of evolution, biological and cultural (i e 
science, art and religion), which are as such different forms of coming 
to grips with reality. And it is precisely Theissen's consistent 
referring to an adaptation to reality that to me reveals his implicit 
realist position.
• Theissen eventually proceeds and views knowledge and faith as two 
different patterns of behaviour in cultural evolution (1984: 18ff). For 
this the analogies between biological and cultural evolution are 
obviously very important:
-  For Theissen every cultural innovation can be seen as a kind of 
'm utation': while it takes over traditional elements by com bining 
them in a new way, it also creates something that has not been 
there before. This may be any new theory or innovative event in art 
or ethics, et cetera. Theissen thus uses the concept 'm utation' 
m etaphorically, leaving behind its literal reference to genetic 
changes. In cultural evolution, cultural innovations therefore per­
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form the same function that mutations do in biological evolution 
by providing a choice of variants (Theissen 1984: 178). These 
mutations, as cultural innovations, are therefore creative responses 
to a particular problem and can happen in language, writing and 
imagery (Theissen 1984: 11).
-  Implied in the metaphor 'm utation' is that of 'selection ': Human 
beings select the most effective cultural patterns of behaviour by 
learning processes, that is by trial-and-error, imaginative learning 
and problem-solving (Theissen 1984: I lf ) . This process of cultural 
selection then leads to an adaptation to a reality 'which extends 
beyond hum anity' (Theissen 1984: 15).
-  In biological evolution, mutation and selection lead to a develop­
ment towards increasingly differentiated organisms only if im ­
provements which have once been achieved are not lost again, and 
are protected from chance deteriorations. In nature of course there 
are remarkable processes which ensure the reduplication of forms 
of life (Theissen 1984: 15). For Theissen it is obvious that cultural 
evolution works with analogous processes: It substitutes tradition 
for genetic transmission, cultural identity for seperation, im prob­
able experiences (Theissen 1984: 15ff). Tradition in this sense is 
therefore seen as the transference of non-genetic information from 
one generation to the next.
4. CONCLUDING STATEM ENTS
4.1 On critical realism in theology
Theissen's remark that 'the only reason for identifying oneself with a 
particular religious tradition is the conviction that it does in fact present 
an appropriate solution to religious problems' (1979: 77) is not only 
revealing but also very relevant for the problem of credibility in 
theological thought.
In an attempt to interpret the epistemological implications of this 
statement for theological thought, I would like to claim that not 
Theissen's critical rationalist attempt at an evolutionary epistemology 
but critical realism offers us what Theissen is rightly searching for, that 
is, a credible integration of knowledge and faith. I have also (already) 
tried to indicate that this position is in fact implied in Theissen's 
arguments.
When Theissen (1984: 19) therefore states that knowledge should be
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seen as the adaptation of cognitive structures to reality, this is already 
an outspoken realist viewpoint. And faith is not a structure which has 
become obsolete, but in fact struggles at the limits of human conscious­
ness (Theissen 1984: 17). As such faith can also be seen as an anticipa­
tion of future possibilities of evolution, which have not yet reached the 
level of our consciousness. While Theissen then proceeds and views 
knowledge and faith as two different patterns of behaviour in cultural 
evolution (1984: 18ff), I would add that not only scientific knowledge 
but indeed also theological reflection could be viewed as 'forms of 
adaptation' to reality. Both in science and theology our constructs and 
theories give us some provisional insight into the different domains of 
the reality of that which is being studied. In this sense the critical realist 
in theology is convinced that there is a 'fit' (McMullin 1984: 35; 1982: 
32), however provisional, between the structure of his theories and the 
structure of the reality he is groping for: an assurance that does not 
come from a comparison between them -  he has no independent access 
to this reality in terms of a naive realist correspondence theory -  but an 
assurance that comes from the inner logic of the realist argumen itself. 
In this way the realist argument shows that our only access to the reality 
on which the scientist -  and thus also the theologian -  focus, is through 
the scientific concept.
In this sense I could agree with Theissen that through scientific -  and 
theological -  knowledge are we enabled to have the 'experiences of 
resonance' which he so often discusses in both his books. Precisely 
through what we provisionally know can we have intim ations of a 
central reality which determines and conditions everything (Theissen 
1984: 19).
When therefore regarded from a much more credible epistemological 
critical realist basis, Theissen (1984: 20) could indeed with good reasons 
state:
Thus evolutionary epistemology confirms a first basic experience 
of any religion, namely that behind the familiar human world a 
mysterious other world opens up which appears only indirectly, 
brokenly and symbolically in the world that we experience and 
interpret.
4.2 On the function of an ultimate religious commitment in 
theological reflection
When Theissen (1984: 26) sees faith and knowledge as attempts to 
understand the whole of life as a response to an ultimate reality, it
HTS  44/1 (1988) 19
becomes very obvious that his thought requires ar\ epistemological 
model of rationality that would be able to accommodate an ultimate 
faith commitment. W ithin the Popperian or critical rationalist paradigm 
this could never be possible, whereas critical realism in theology opens 
up a way to acknowledge the fundamental role played by commitment
-  both theoretical and ultimate religious commitments -  in scientific 
and theological reflection.
Theissen's decision for Christian faith forms a consistent theme in his 
own thought, and statements like the following would indeed require a 
definite account-rendering of his own commitment to Christianity:
But what is that mysterious ultimate reality towards which our 
organic, intellectual and religious structures develop attempts at 
adaptation? Religious tradition knows only one appropriate term 
for it: God (1984: 25). Compared with this name, all other terms 
like 'central reality' and 'ultimate reality' are only counsels of 
desperation (1984: 30).
4.3 On the role of metaphors in theological reflection
Theissen (1984: 87) acknowledges that images of God from evolutionary 
theory might show us a way of overcoming the hermeneutical conflict 
between New Testament Christology and modern consciousness. He 
also correctly states that the use of metaphors leads us into the obscure 
intermediate area between poetry and reality, and between creative 
imagination and reality. Metaphors therefore transcend boundaries 
which are set by strict reflection and are therefore indispensable for 
theological reflection (1984: 87).
This of course -  as we saw earlier -  is true of all scientific thought, and 
that is why the criterion of fertility is directly linked to the use of 
models and metaphors in a critical realist paradigm (cf McMullin 1984: 
30ff). This is also why it should be obvious that new metaphors in 
theology should be creatively developed with material from the expe­
rience of our time.
The way in which metaphors are thus linked to the very centre of 
scientific thought is of the utmost importance, not only for understand­
ing scientific realism, but also for evaluating critical realism in theology. 
The direct implication of this important fact is that the language of the 
scientist is not so direct and 'literal' as it was once thought to be. Not 
only are even the most literal-sounding terms 'theory-laden', but since
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they are always to a certain extent provisional, they must be regarded as 
metaphoric (cf McMullin 1982: 37). To regard certain concepts as 
metaphorical is not to say that they are not precise, or that they are 
always ambiguous. On the contrary, McMulhn (1982: 37) states it well: 
Metaphors are not normally ambiguous, yet at crucial moments in the 
continuing development of science, they do generate am biguity, just 
the sort of fruitful ambiguity that permits a theory to be extended, 
reshaped, rethought et cetera.
Therefore:
The metaphor is helping to illuminate something that is not well 
understood in advance, perhaps, some aspect of human life that 
we find genuinely puzzling or frightening or mysterious. The 
manner in which such metaphors work is by tentative suggestion 
(McMullin 1984: 31).
The role of metaphor in scientific thought is also the scientific realist's 
answer to Kuhn's well-known thesis of the incom m ensurability be­
tween paradigms, and therefore often also between theories, in science. 
As regards the problem of continuity when the scientist moves from a 
rejected theory to a new theory, what provides the continuity is the 
underlying metaphor or metaphors of successive theories. Thus one 
may find that in scientific thought one aspect of an original or older 
theory may eventually be dropped, while others are thought through 
again and creatively retained. Even in a total 'paradigm sw itch' it will 
be only the metaphor(s) that constitute the continuity.
In our understanding of the world -  also our scientific and theological 
understanding -  metaphors therefore play a significant if not central 
role. In fact the explanatory power or success of a theory depends on the 
effective metaphors it can call upon. For this reason I would call the 
epistemological model that scientific realism offers us, a relational 
model. The scientist as subject, the metaphor-maker (McMullin 1982: 
37) is now recognized as an inseparable part of the scientific en­
deavour. Of this McMullin (1982: 37) says:
Yet this in no way lessens the realism of science, the thrust of the 
scientist to grasp the 'irreducible X' before him. It is, indeed, 
precisely the quality of a scientific theory as fruitful metaphor, as 
lending itself to further development, that most comments it as 
good science.
For the critical realist the theoretical language of theological reflection is
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therefore theoretical explanation of a special sort. It is metaphorical, and 
thus open-ended and ever capable of further development. The precise 
metaphorical basis of all scientific language gives this language re­
sources of suggestion that are the most immediate testimony of its 
ontological worth.
Against this background it should now be clear why scientific realism 
has developed into one of the most important positions in the current 
philosophy of science debate: It not only highlights the role of m eta­
phorical reference in scientific theory-formation while honouring the 
provisionality and socio-historical nature of all knowledge, but it also 
enables us to retain the ideals of truth, objectivity, rationality and 
scientific progress in an exciting and re-interpreted way. It is therefore 
not at all surprising that the realist challenge has at present been taken 
on in the hum anities, especially the social sciences and also in theology. 
I am fully convinced that, because of the important relational analysis 
and the accompanying interpretative and thus hermeneutical dim en­
sion of all knowledge in the realist paradigm, this venture can in no 
valid way be seen as a return to the positivist ideal of the uniformity of 
all scientific knowledge. On the contrary: it opens up creative and 
exciting possibilities -  also and especially for theology.
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